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MARTIN ADELMAN: This is our last session of the day after the kind
of hot session we just went through. This is going to be a little bit hot, I think.
What we're going to do is a tradition at Fordham, because Dimitrios always
delivers 25 minutes, exactly 25 minutes, not 24.5 minutes, not 25.5 minutes, but
25 minutes, where he summarizes everything that's happened in patent law in
the US in that time.
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We're going to get back into Section 101,1 which incidentally, I might
mention, that it actually goes back to 1948, in the Funk Brothers2 case. If you
read Funk Brothers, that was the beginning of this crazy nonsense. It was written
by Mr. Justice Douglas, who may be one of the most brilliant justices to ever sit
on the Supreme Court and was almost always wrong. A terrific instinct for error.
He was badly wrong in this case. However, what you will find if you read the
case, is that there were dissents. There was serious intellectual effort to point
out that he was wrong.
However, the second thing you have to remember, and everybody should
read and reread, Kimble v. Marvel3, where the Supreme Court says, "Once we
decide a case of statutory interpretation, we stick with it no matter how stupid
the case is, we will follow it." Justice Kagan explains that. It's a fascinating read.
If you remember that that's what they do, the 101 jurisprudence is not all that
surprising. You start with a very bad case, plainly wrong, and you follow it, and
you follow it through. There's one possible exception, it is the Deere4 case, five
to four, but that can easily be explained by the fact that the Supreme Court was
extremely nervous around the time of the creation of the Federal Circuit.
They've forgotten about the Federal Circuit and why they were nervous, but
they were. Two justices jumped from Parker v. Flook,5 and they jumped on
Deere, but that's the only deviation.
We're going to be back into 101 again. Everybody has their name on the
screen. I have all of the bios, you have all the bios, so I'm not going to read their
distinguished background. With that, 25 minutes but no more and no less, go to
Dimitrios.
DIMITRIOS DRIVAS: Marty. Thank you.
MARTIN ADELMAN: I want to mention that you're for the first time,
really going to discuss a constitutional law issue and we're going to act as
administrative law lawyers for a few minutes. That's something we haven't ever
done before, I don't believe.
DIMITRIOS DRIVAS: Great. There was an excellent panel earlier on
patent eligibility. There are two cases pending certiorari petitions at the
Supreme Court this term on 101 itself. As we all know, patent eligibility is a
judicial doctrine. It's not in the statute. The exclusions are laws of nature, natural
phenomenon, and abstract ideas.
The Supreme Court in Mayo6 set forth its Alice/Mayo two-step test. First
step, you determine if the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, and
if so, then you determine, is there something in the claim that transforms it to a
patentable eligible claim?
The first case we're going to discuss is American Axle v. Neapco.7 It is a
patent to a method of manufacturing a drive shaft. The petition for certiorari is
pending, but what I find interesting about the case is the questions presented
and specifically the second question presented in the petition.

1

35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
3
Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 576 U.S. 446 (2015).
4
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
5
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
6
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
7
Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc. v. Neapco Holdings LLC, 967 F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
2
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That really goes to, is it a question of law for the court based on the scope
of the claims, or a question of fact for the jury based on the state of the art at the
time of the patent, which to me seems to be obviousness, novelty, enablement,
all the patentability issues that one routinely tries in a patent case, and going
back to the earlier panel's discussion as to, are these really the threshold issues
that should be addressed prior to patent eligibility? I think a lot of the case law,
the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit case law, has conflated patent eligibility
with obviousness and novelty.
On the next slide, we have a representative claim of the patent at issue,
and that's Claim 22, which was the focus of both the district court and the
Federal Circuit analysis. As you can see, it's a method claim. It's a simple claim,
but it has some mechanical steps, providing a hollow shaft member, tuning a
mass, and stiffness of at least one liner, and inserting the liner into the shaft
member.
Now the District Court applying the Mayo test found that it was
essentially the application of Hooke's law and friction damping. 8 Now this is a
result of evidence presented by experts on summary judgment. There's no
mention of Hooke's law in the patent specification, but the court found that that
is exactly what the claim is directed to and that the additional steps in the claim
were just routine activity, for example, tuning, inserting, et cetera.
The Federal Circuit picked up on that and came up with its decision that
the claim is essentially the application of the law of nature, Hooke's law, and is
nothing more, and that the claim itself does not disclose how to accomplish the
stated objectives of the methods. They found the claim to be invalid as directed
to ineligible subject matter. Now, you'll see that there was a strong dissent by
Judge Moore to the opinion written by Dyk and joined by Judge Taranto, and
that after the case was denied an en banc hearing, the majority decision was
modified to address some of the points made in the dissent.
It's clear from the dissent that Judge Moore thought, this is a totally new
test that compresses the patent eligibility test of Mayo and Alice from a twopart test into a one-part test, and that if there is some abstract idea or natural
phenomenon that the claim is addressing, if there is nothing more or know-how
to, that this is really conflating enablement with patent eligibility. The court and
Judge Moore addressed that as the new Nothing More test. 9
In denying en banc, it was six, six. There were a number of dissents. One
of the dissents pointed out that the case law on patent eligibility has become so
unpredictable as to have a serious effect on innovation and incentive and
criticized the Nothing More test and how the test itself is really conflating
eligibility and enablement.
The next case that's up before the Supreme Court on petition for
certiorari is Ariosa v. Illumina.10 Now, this is the result of really extensive
litigation between these two parties, and a previous case, Ariosa v. Sequenom,11
where a similar patent, not related to the patents here, was found to be invalid.
Oh, not invalid, addressed to ineligible subject matter. The patents that are the
8

Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc. v. Neapco Holdings LLC, 309 F. Supp. 3d 218, 225 (D. Del.

2018).
9

Am. Axle, 967 F.3d at 1304 (Moore, J., dissenting).
Illumina, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. 967 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2020), cert.
denied, No. (R46-29), 2021 WL 2323012 (U.S. May 21, 2021).
11
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
10
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subject of this case are to a method of preparing cfDNA, cell-free fetal DNA
from parental source to identify which DNA was from the father and which
from the mother in the mother's serum.
Now, the basis for the invention was the discovery that the paternal DNA
was of a certain smaller size of 300 to 500 base pairs, whereas the maternal
DNA was larger. As you can see from the representative claim from the ’751
Patent, the claim addresses selectively removing DNA fragments that are
greater than approximately 500 base pairs. That was the point of novelty and
actually, the factor that the Federal Circuit found to take this out of the patentineligible sphere.12
The District Court found the claims addressed to a natural phenomenon
and that the claim steps were well known and conventional, and specifically
said that it was difficult to distinguish the claims from those found to be patentineligible in the previous case between the parties on the separate patent, which
was for a method of detecting paternally inherited cfDNA by amplifying and
detecting it.
The Federal Circuit in an opinion by Judge Lourie came up with a
distinguishing factor that this is not a diagnostic case, it is not a method of
treatment case; it is a method of preparation case. It found that Myriad, which
found the Supreme Court decision in Myriad,13 which found that naturally
occurring DNA sequences are a product of nature, specifically declined to
extend its holding to methods resigning innovative processes to isolate DNA.
Since it found this to be patent-eligible under step one, it found that it had no
real need to reach step two of the Alice test.
In a strong dissent by Judge Reyna, he said that the claims in this case
are directed to precisely the discovery of size discrepancy and nothing more and
could not distinguish this case from Myriad.14 Both of these cases are pending
petitions for certiorari, the question is whether the Supreme Court will take them
up with two 101 cases in this term, and whether they believe they can actually
fix the mess that has been created with either of these cases at this time or
whether they should leave it to Congress.
There are a number of other cases coming out of the Federal Circuit, one
recently, In re Stanford,15 where two different patents were found to be patentineligible by the PTAB for essentially a genomic analysis that was based on
statistical procedures. The types of data used that were different from that was
in the prior art, but they were couched in terms of a computer system. The
Federal Circuit found that they did nothing to distinguish or transform the
computer system to something new, and therefore, those were also patentinvalid.
Next, we'll discuss the enablement and written description issues. What
we find is that the Federal Circuit is taking a hard line on claims that have
functional limitations, and particularly those claims that have two or dualfunctional limitations in the claim. They apply the Wands factors,16 of course,
12

Illumina, Inc., 967 F.3d at 1329.
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
14
Illumina, Inc., 967 F.3d at 1337 (Reyna, J., dissenting).
15
In re Bd. Of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 991 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir.
13

2021).
“[Factors] include (1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of
direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the nature
of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the
16

4

Session 2C

which are the Federal Circuit's case law on the determination of undue
experimentation.
In the Idenix17 case, here is the sample claim from the patent. It's a
method of treating hepatitis C virus infection by administering an effective
amount of a compound. The District Court had construed that as nucleosides
that had a specific substitution. If you read the decision, it talks about 2' up and
2' down. The court construed the claims to be directed to a methyl group in the
2' down position and nonhydrogen functional groups in the 3' up and 2' up
positions.
The patent disclosure and the drug that was brought by Idenix to market
had a hydroxyl group in the 2' up and 3' up position, and the accused product
had a fluorine in the 2' up position. However, the fluorine 2' up was not disclosed
in the specification. Given the claim construction, Gilead stipulated to
infringement, and the jury found that the asserted claims were valid and awarded
damages of $2.54 billion.
Gilead filed the judgment as a matter of law on non-enablement and lack
of written description, and the District Court 18 granted the motion on nonenablement but did not grant the motion for lack of written description, finding
that there was no guidance within the specification for determining which
molecules would meet the dual-functional limitations of the claim of treating
hepatitis C infection with an effective amount of compound.
This was appealed, of course, at the Federal Circuit, a non de novo
review. The court found that, not only was the patent invalid for nonenablement, but also reversed on written description grounds 19 and found the
patent was not meeting the written description requirements. I think the main
takeaway from this case is that synthesizing and screening tens of thousands of
compounds, even if the synthesis is routine and the screening methods are
routine, can still amount to undue experimentation, even if that is routine, due
to the amount of experimentation that has to be used in order to determine
whether the compounds meet the limitations of the claims.
In a dissent, Judge Newman said it is improper for the court to rely on
compounds disclosed in the specification but not claimed, in order to find nonenablement and lack of written description. 20 It's difficult to reconcile that with
the claim construction.
It's a difficult case to determine what actually falls within the claim
construction, but clearly, one of the issues that the majority focused on was that
during the trial, there was testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art
would have relied on a test to a specific enzyme to see if the compounds
activated that enzyme, which was NS5B. The court found that that was not part
of the claim construction, there was no disclosure of that test in the specification,
and therefore, it was improper for the court to rely on the knowledge of a person
of skill in the art to supplement that which was not in the specification.

predictability of unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of those claims.” In re Wands,
858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
17
Idenix Pharms. LLC v. Gilead Scis. Inc., 941 F.3d 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
18
Idenix Pharms, LLC v. Gilead Scis. Inc., No. CV 14-846-LPS, 2018 WL 1313973
(D.Del. Mar. 14, 2018).
19
Idenix, 941 F.3d at 1153.
20
Id. at 1166 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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The next case is a recent decision by the Federal Circuit in Amgen v.
The claims, in this case, are to an isolated monoclonal antibody, which
must react with or bind to one specific residue from an epitope on PCSK9, and
also block PCSK9 from binding to the LDL receptor, in order to effectively treat
levels of cholesterol. Again, this is a claim with two functional features, one
binding to one amino acid residue in an epitope of more than one amino acid
residue obviously, and also the ability to block the binding with PCSK9 to its
receptor.
There's a long history to this case. The case was originally tried to a
jury.22 The jury found that the patent was non-obvious and enabled. It went up
to the Federal Circuit, which reversed on enablement and written description. 23
Petition for certiorari was denied. It was remanded for a new trial on enablement
and a written description. The jury again found that the patent was valid and did
not lack enablement, or it had an adequate written description. On a judgment
as a matter of law, the court applying the Wands factors found that the patent
claims were invalid for non-enablement.24
It was appealed to the Federal Circuit, and the Federal Circuit took a
hard line, finding that functional limitations, while they do not necessarily
preclude claims that meet the enablement requirement, pose high hurdles in
fulfilling the enablement requirement, and that whereas here, undue
experimentation was involved in identifying from the many thousands of
monoclonal antibodies that could have met the limitations of the claims, those
which bound and specifically blocked the binding of PCSK9.25 To make such a
determination would require undue experimentation.
The message is: functional limitations and claims can be a minefield.
Patent prosecutors often insert them in order to obtain allowance of claims and
distinguish their claims and invention from the prior art, but as we now find, the
Federal Circuit is taking a hard view on the scope of functional limitations.
There are two cases now that are being argued in the Supreme Court this
term. The first one is on assignor estoppel. Assignor estoppel is a judicial
doctrine that precludes one who has assigned their patent rights for good
consideration, to later challenge that patent in court and claim that the patent is
invalid. Now years ago, the Supreme Court rejected the doctrine of licensee
estoppel in Lear v. Adkins,26 which prohibited a licensee from challenging the
validity of a patent that it had licensed, but that is a different doctrine from what
we see in assign or estoppel, and assignor estoppel still is the law.
The case before the court is Minerva Surgical v. Hologic.27 This is going
to be argued on April 21st, in two weeks. In Minerva, the inventor had invented
a medical device and methods for using the medical device and had assigned
his rights to a company he had formed. The company was sold, and
subsequently sold again to Hologic. The inventor went on to found Minerva
Surgical, and came up with a new device that was arguably different from the
device that he had assigned and the patents that he had assigned previously.
Sanofi.21

21

Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, Aventisub LLC, 987 F.3d 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, 227 F. Supp. 3d 333 (D. Del. 2017).
23
Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, 872 F.3d 1367, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
24
Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, No. CV 14-1317-RGA, 2019 WL 4058927, at *13 (D. Del
Aug. 28, 2019).
25
Amgen Inc., 987 F.3d at 1087.
26
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
27
Hologic, Inc. v. Minerva Surgical, Inc., 957 F.3d 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
22
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Hologic in continuation applications of the original patents, sought and
obtained broader claims and asserted them against Minerva. Minerva filed two
IPRs,28 one of which was granted on the methods patent, and the other which
was not instituted on the apparatus patent, and the case went on in District Court.
In District Court, the court found that assignor estoppel was a viable doctrine,
and that Minerva could not assert that the patents were valid, and found that the
patents were infringed. 29 The jury on a trial of willful infringement and
damages, awarded damages to Hologic.
Subsequently, the PTAB 30 invalidated the method patent, and even
though the decision, the jury award of damages did not apportion between the
two patents, so the jury award of damages was upheld. However, an injunction
did not issue because the PTAB had invalidated the patent, and therefore, it was
invalid ab initio, from the beginning.
That was appealed to the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit found that
the assignor estoppel did not apply in the IPR PTAB decision, since any one
statute provides that a person can bring an IPR except the patent holder itself,
but that assignor estoppel did apply to the district court proceeding. Judge Stoll
who wrote the opinion stated that it was time to reexamine whether this doctrine
should apply going forward. Critically, in an instance whereas here whatever
the inventor assigned was not exactly what was asserted against them.
Another interesting point is that in oral argument, the Supreme Court
has asked the Solicitor General also to present the argument. The US' position
is that the assignor estoppel doctrine should not be jettisoned, but its contour
should be clarified so that in an instance such as this where the patent has been
expanded beyond that which the inventor assigned, the investor should be
allowed to challenge it on those grounds.
Finally, probably the most important case before the Supreme Court, this
term has to do with the constitutionality of the appointments clause 31 in the
appointment of the administrative patent judges in the PTAB. This case arises
from a number of cases with a complicated history of Smith & Nephew v.
Arthrex,32 Arthrex being the patent holder. The patents were challenged in IPR
proceedings and invalidated. The question was raised at the Federal Circuit
appeal level whether the appointment of the administrative patent judges under
the America Invents Act violated the appointments clause of the constitution
and therefore, whether the decision should be vacated.
What it turns on is whether the administrative patent judges are principal
officers or inferior officers under the appointments clause. This is the
appointments clause of the constitution. I'm not going to go into it because we're
running out of time, and I've already probably broken my pledge to Marty.
MARTIN ADELMAN: Not yet.
DIMITRIOS DRIVAS: Oh, okay. Well, I'm close.
MARTIN ADELMAN: I'm going to give you your two minutes.

28

Inter partes review.
Hologic, Inc. v. Minerva Surgical, Inc. 325 F. Supp. 3d 507 (D. Del. 2018).
30
Patent Trial and Appeal Board.
31
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2.
32
Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 941 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019), cert. granted
sub nom.
29
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DIMITRIOS DRIVAS: Let's skip the appointments clause and go right
to it. The Federal Circuit relied on Supreme Court precedent in the Edmond33
case, which was the case that dealt with a military tribunal of the Coast Guard,
and the judges on that tribunal and whether they were appointed principal
officers or inferior officers. There were three factors: whether an appointed
official with a principal officer has the power to review the officer's decision;
the level of supervision; and the appointed officer's official power to remove the
officer.
The Federal Circuit found that the first and second factors weighed in
favor of finding that the APJs34 were principal officers, that there was some
supervision over the APJs by the Director of Patents and the Secretary of
Commerce. That weighed against it, but overall, that given the fact that they
decide the validity of patents and that their decision cannot be overturned or
reheard by the director himself or a principal officer, that they were, in fact,
principal officers.
These are some of the factors listed on this slide that the Federal Circuit
found convincing as to designating them as principal officers. The remedy was
to sever from the statute the tenure positions of the termination provision under
Title 535 of the APJs as federal employees and to make them terminable at will
by the director or the Secretary of Commerce.
Under Title 5, they may only be removed for cause to promote the
efficiency of the service. The Federal Circuit opined that that would be the most
restrictive revision of the statute in order to preserve its constitutionality and
remanded the case to be tried by a new panel, for rehearing by a new panel
appointed of APJs appointed under the new revised statute as severed by the
Federal Circuit.
There were some very strong dissents that this was not the correct
remedy, that the Federal Circuit went too far. There were other dissents if you
see the next slides, that the APJs are actually inferior officers because there was
sufficient policymaking authority and review of their decisions by a board
appointed by the director and by the Federal Circuit, so that they were, in fact,
operating as inferior officers.
There were over 30 amicus briefs filed in support of both parties on
either side. In addition to Smith & Nephew, Arthrex, and the US Solicitor
General, there were at least 10 different proposed remedies to the statute and
what the court should do. If we go to the last slide here, I leave it to the panel to
discuss the possible outcomes and their consequences. I'll stop there, Marty.
MARTIN ADELMAN: Thank you, Dimitrios. I think you were one
minute over, but given that this is an unusual situation, we'll waive it this year.
Also, that Arthrex case is really complicated because you have to keep in mind
that the real function of the PTAB is to eliminate the jury trial, and the jury trial
is required because in 1791, Americans didn't want to pay their British creditors.
This is American history, and this is the way to get rid of the jury in a key case.
Hatch-Waxman36 also gets rid of juries because, in my view, it's nonsense to
have a jury trial in patent cases. Nobody in the world does it. If anybody even
suggested it, I think they would be treated to a trip to the insane asylum.
33

Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997).
Administrative patent judges.
35
5 C.F.R. § 300.707.
36
21 U.S.C. § 355.
34
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Anyhow, it's something the Supreme Court has to deal with. It's up there.
That's what they get paid the big bucks for so we can discuss that. Hopefully,
next year, this will be decided one way or another. I wonder if we could turn for
a moment to the key money case here, which I find fascinating, is Idenix. Maybe
$2 billion in the modern world is nothing anymore, but it still sounds like a lot
of money to me, and it got overturned. Maybe, Ari, do you know what actually
happened in Europe with respect to the corresponding patents?
ARI LAAKKONEN: I don't know about the corresponding patent, but I
can talk about the corresponding doctrine, if that's of any use.
MARTIN ADELMAN: That's of use, but there actually were
corresponding– The corresponding patent to Idenix was litigated in England, in
Germany, in the European Patent Office, and ultimately, it went down. I've got
all the cases here, but nobody gave it a broad interpretation that would actually
cover the products made by Gilead, Sofosbuvir, something like that. Extremely
important drug, multi-billion dollar drug for hepatitis C. The key was the
argument that the fluorine had to be in a particular position. The question is,
well, you had the methyl group in a different position, was that good enough to
justify a generic invention? Nobody read it that broadly, but an American jury
did and that was overturned. [crosstalk]
ARI LAAKKONEN: The underpinning doctrine here is that if you have
overbroad claiming, you end up essentially losing a part of your patent. I do
think it's interesting the way that you can diverge an outcome. One way of
looking at it here is that, because, in the UK, you can amend a pattern down
during litigation. If you have an overbroad claim, the answer to it can be you
amend down to what's actually protectable. What is the core of what you really
invented? If at that stage, you end up amending down to something where you
don't actually have support for what you're trying to amend down to, then you
know that the patent was insufficient to begin with.
MARTIN ADELMAN: That wasn't the problem. The problem is very
simple. What they had was a lot of work and the potential for writing a generic
claim, which would cover the specific invention made by Gilead, which was the
big money. They didn't have a drug that was covered by their patent, so
amending down wouldn't really help them. What they wanted, understandably,
is a very broad claim saying that they were entitled to a generic claim. It was
the same argument they made in the United States and got a jury to give them
$2 billion.
NICHOLAS GROOMBRIDGE: Marty, can I chime in on this? First of
all, let me say I'm all in favor of having Americans pay their British creditors,
on your jumping-off point.
MARTIN ADELMAN: Eliminate the [unintelligible] and we won't have
this problem.
NICHOLAS GROOMBRIDGE: Exactly. To me, in Idenix, there are
some unusual factual considerations, if I remember the disclosure rightly.
STEVEN LIEBERMAN: Marty, this is Steve. Can I pivot to a slightly
different area?
MARTIN ADELMAN: Yes, we might as well move in because I think
Nick had some interesting comments.
STEVEN LIEBERMAN: I just wanted to mention a couple of very
practical patent developments that have taken place in the last year or so. I think
these are trends that most people who litigate have seen. One is the tremendous
9
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influence that litigation funders have had in patent litigation in a way that
they've never had before. You have tons of money and smart money behind
patent litigation.
They're investing in multi-patent lawsuits, often lawsuits that come from
individuals who have bought patent portfolios from operating entities that have
gone out of business, like Maxell buying the Hitachi portfolio, et cetera. In fact,
if you like big money cases, one of the biggest patent judgments this last year
was VLSI vs. Intel.37 VLSI was not only funded by a litigation funder, but VLSI
was also created by a litigation funder, Fortress Investments.
That's had a huge impact. It's had a huge impact, because these guys are
very, very careful in their due diligence process. They've been picking out
strong patents and it's driving a lot of big money cases. Number two,
discretionary denials by the PTAB using Fintiv 38 factors and for other reasons,
that's also having an enormous impact. There have been so many discretionary
denials, that it's driving all sorts of litigation decisions, for example, patent
plaintiffs are now thinking about filing lawsuits and choosing to file lawsuits,
in rocket docket jurisdictions because they know that as a practical matter,
applying the Fintiv factors, that it's highly likely that PTAB will never institute
an IPR if you get a case scheduled for trial within 12 months of filing the
complaint.
It's driving litigation to faster jurisdictions. It's increasing the trend of
cases going to places like Western District of Texas, the Eastern District of
Texas. The last point I wanted to make was one practical aspect of 101
jurisprudence. I think one of the things we've started to see in the last year is
that defendants are starting to figure out the right procedural stage to raise 101
issues.
It's not always 12(b)(6),39 sometimes it's a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. Sometimes it's summary judgment. I think we're going to see more
and more these issues going to the jury with special questions for the jury, so
that the patent can be reversed on appeal if the jury handles the special questions
in a particular way. Those were some practical developments I've seen that have
considerable significance this last year.
MARTIN ADELMAN: That's fascinating. Anybody want to comment?
ADAM MOSSOFF: I'll just comment very briefly. Marty, is it okay if
I–
MARTIN ADELMAN: Yes, go ahead.
ADAM MOSSOFF: On the Fintiv discretionary denial issue. Yes, this
has impacted the PTAB decision-making process at the institution stage in the
past year, but one can argue that the PTAB decision-making process before
Fintiv was fundamentally broken, because it did not reflect the original intent
of the America Invents Act40 in creating the PTAB. I was on the Hill during the
legislative debates over the PTAB and the AIA, and it was repeatedly stated at
that time that the PTAB was not supposed to create a two-track litigation
system.
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The PTAB was not to be a secondary litigation process that would run
concurrently along with an Article III41 court case. It was supposed to be only
an efficient, easy, and quick way to resolve the legitimacy and validity of patents
at the early stages of litigation, just as they do in Germany, where first you have
the validity issue decided before you have the infringement issue decided.
As the rules at the PTAB were put into effect, however, because the AIA
imposed no substantive or procedural restrictions on it from the get-go other
than essentially that it must decide its cases within a year, it very quickly turned
into a two-track litigation system. Empirical studies have shown that 60% to
70% of PTAB petitioners are defendants in Article III cases.
MARTIN ADELMAN: Let me stop you there Adam, you're saying that
the intent was to file the IPR before there's litigation.
ADAM MOSSOFF: That was the original argument. People would
receive the demand letter, such as mom-and-pop stores and small businesses,
and the PTAB would provide an easy and inexpensive way for them to have the
patent invalidated–
MARTIN ADELMAN: The real function of the PTAB is to get rid of
the jury trial because we shouldn't have jury trials.
ADAM MOSSOFF: That was resolved by Oil States which said that the
Seventh Amendment doesn't apply to the PTAB.42 But the concerns about the
PTAB go way beyond jury trials, such as serial petitioning with sometimes 30
to 40 IPR petitions filed against the same patent. We can't drop that context in
talking about the situation of the Fintiv discretionary denials, and what impact
that those denials are having because it always must be compared to the
empirical baseline of what came before.
MARTIN ADELMAN: Got it, did you have a comment because Nick
now is back?
NICHOLAS GROOMBRIDGE: Let me see if I can do any better this
time, Marty, but on Adam's point. I think maybe I'm seeing this in the chat that
I think there was certainly a viewpoint that what would happen was the district
courts would stay cases when there was an IPR, and perhaps more broadly,
whether one likes it or not, isn't this an example of competition between
tribunals in which the timeline of the PTAB is now motivating certain district
courts to go more quickly? I've always thought we saw a similar thing in Europe
in which competition between national court systems motivated the English
court system to do patent cases much more quickly in the 1990s than they had
before that. Is this a good thing where we see different tribunals, responding to
what others do in order to try to be more efficient?
LAURA SHERIDAN: Marty, could I jump in on this issue?
MARTIN ADELMAN: Yes.
LAURA SHERIDAN: The purpose and the debate, as I remember it,
around IPR and post-grant more broadly, was favoring PTAB proceedings.
Favoring the agency correcting its own errors because it's cost-effective, and
because it's efficient and it's time-bound. It's the place where these decisions
should be made. The function of IPR has really been to improve quality by
creating this incentive upfront.
41
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U.S. CONST. art. III.
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I think what you're seeing a lot now is people understand if you want
your patent to be strong, you will do a prior art search and you will craft claims
that are IPR proof because now you're understanding there is this error
correction mechanism at the backend, and you'd like your patent to withstand
that. With IPR, I think the debate understood that this was almost always going
to be in the context of litigation, which is why they did come up with the oneyear window, but it was also understood that it would have this tremendous
effect on incentivizing the right behavior in the first place, which ex parte reexam certainly wasn't doing, and IPR was designed to replace that.
MARTIN ADELMAN: Got that. Nick, you want to comment?
NICHOLAS GROOMBRIDGE: I'll try, Marty. I was just saying in
response to what Adam said that, isn't this an example of competition between
different tribunals? What is happening is the court system is actually trying to
go faster because of the timeline of PTAB proceedings. Maybe that's a good
thing.
STEVEN LIEBERMAN: Except that it's not all the courts, it's a very
small number of courts are going faster, because for whatever reason, they want
to have the patent cases in that jurisdiction. One of the things that almost always
comes along with that speed, at least in several of those jurisdictions, is that they
have jettisoned many of the rules of federal civil procedure. Rule 56 43 does not
exist as a practical matter in the Eastern District of Texas because that would
interfere with getting a case to trial in 12 to 14 months. I'm not sure that's a good
thing.
MARTIN ADELMAN: So, you're essentially arguing, Steve, that the
speed which we think would be a good thing is a competitive technique to grab
cases, and what they're really saying is, "We'll give you, not necessarily a fair
trial, but one biased towards the person who's filing the case.”
ADAM MOSSOFF: I appreciate and applaud Steve's appeal that there
should be due process and that we should follow civil rules of procedure and
other laws. Therefore, I fully expect Steve to come out against serial petitions,
panel stacking, the denial of the right to amend patents in the IPR process, and
all the other PTAB practices that the Supreme Court has identified as
“shenanigans.”
MARTIN ADELMAN: Adam is with you on all that.
[crosstalk]
ADAM MOSSOFF: Join me to support the STRONGER Patent Act.
[laughter]
MARTIN ADELMAN: I'm against all shenanigans.
[laughter]
LAURA SHERIDAN: Marty, can I just point out, to Steve's point
though, I think the trials aren't even happening. The trial dates, largely, they're
just set, and then the PTAB can make decisions based on those dates, but those
dates are not chiseled in stone. They're barely written in pencil. Those dates will
move, and more likely than not, validity will never be decided. This idea that
the PTAB is punting the validity question to district court – district court is not
deciding validity. That patent continues to be asserted and enforced and the
validity assessment isn't even done because these trial dates are simply not being
met.
43
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MARTIN ADELMAN: You would argue that the discretionary denials
are really a bad thing?
LAURA SHERIDAN: Yes. What it's ended up doing is driving litigants
to use ex parte re-exam44 again, which I thought the whole point of IPR was to
replace that.
MARTIN ADELMAN: It's fascinating. Adam has a strong patent focus
which I understand. I have the focus that anything that gets rid of a jury trial
makes it a more sensible system. Since we can't amend the Constitution, even
Adam can't do that, that this is the next best thing, and we should craft proper
rules to make it as effective a tribunal as possible. I do want to at least get back.
If we set aside for the moment these litigation funders, because the
argument is they're only going to fund strong cases. I don't see any point in
funding a cheap case, unless you're a holdup artist, and you're just going to file
cases, then say, "Look, it's a million dollars for you to defend, and I'll settle for
50,000." If you're talking about big cases like the ones against Intel, I took a
look at those patents. I'll make you a bet, Steve, they'll never hold up on appeal.
They'll never get $2 billion from Intel.
STEVEN LIEBERMAN: In general, the big litigation funders, by and
large, are doing pretty serious due diligence. In my experience, their due
diligence is weighted more towards the damages model than it is to issues of
[unintelligible] infringement.
MARTIN ADELMAN: Yes, they said we've done everything.
STEVEN LIEBERMAN: Well, because that's where they have their
expertise. They have financial analysis expertise. They look at the damages
model, and when you're evaluating a patent case and you're doing it before it's
even been filed, how well can you estimate the likelihood of success of a
plaintiff unless it's dead on 101 grounds? What's the difference between 40%
and 60%? It's really hard to do in advance like that. They're looking at the
damage models, but they are looking seriously, I think.
MARTIN ADELMAN: That's logical, you'd look at how much you
could collect. They got over $2 billion. I didn't study the patents in great detail,
but I'm just willing to bet we'll get nowhere near that amount. The Idenix patent
was actually a better patent. Anyhow, Nick, you had a comment on the Idenix
litigation that got cut off and you got frozen. I thought that was something bad.
NICHOLAS GROOMBRIDGE: Let me try again. I found one of the
things about Idenix, about the decision, which is troublesome. It seems to
suggest that for purposes of enablement it's relevant, how long it would take to
create all of the compounds within the scope of the genus. It seems like if you're
claiming a large genus, then as Dimitrios pointed out, that the rationale there
was even if testing one compound is routine, you have to test thousands or tens
of thousands or hundreds of thousands, then that's undue experimentation and
it seems like it convert– There's a risk that the courts go in the direction of
making enablement purely a quantitative exercise.
MARTIN ADELMAN: Well, do you think that there was a broad
invention there? I don't care what the jury said.
NICHOLAS GROOMBRIDGE: I think I'm not the best person to
answer that.
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MARTIN ADELMAN: Well, there, the methyl without the critical
thing, which was the fluorine the bottom at the two position.
NICHOLAS GROOMBRIDGE: My recollection, Marty, and I could be
wrong on this, is that in the spec, they disclosed all of the halogens except for
fluorine.
MARTIN ADELMAN: Yes.
NICHOLAS GROOMBRIDGE: They then were trying to get claims to
a molecule using fluorine.
MARTIN ADELMAN: Well, because generically, they were talking
about methyl then the opposition [unintelligible] the opposition. Generically, it
covers fluorine.
NICHOLAS GROOMBRIDGE: Oh, correct. I think there was certainly
an invention there, but whether there was a sufficient basis to cover what Gilead
was doing, I'm not sure.
DIMITRIOS DRIVAS: I agree with Nicholas. I think the caution is if
you're going to claim broadly, be careful about putting a functional limitation
in that claim, especially in the chemical sense. Judge Newman's dissent, she
would have found that the claims are enabled, but not infringed.
MARTIN ADELMAN: Well, so far, I can't find any place in the world
that found liability. It was litigated all over the world.
ARI LAAKKONEN: Well, that's reassuring because there's some
consistency there, but I think that one of the themes that comes out of this case
for me is that in the US, it's an enablement issue. When you look at an overbroad
claim for that in the UK and Europe, generally, it's an insufficiency point, but
from a prosecution perspective, it just shows that maybe ambitious claiming
may not be so rewarding after all, because if you get nothing from your plane
then why bother with the patent in the first place?
In the UK, those patterns didn't work. I think the general objection is that
there may be an example of armchair claiming or armchair patenting, where
people, instead of disclosing what the invention is, they say, "Well, what is it
that they would like to achieve?"
You do experimentation in order to find out whether you've actually got
there, you do a certain amount of experimentation to actually make the
invention. Then once you've made it, you look at the claim to figure out does it
fall within the claim itself? The problem there is that the invention itself hasn't
been disclosed and it hasn't been taught, which is part of the fundamental patent
bargain, because the idea of the patent, of course, as everyone knows, is that
you give that invention to the public domain. In exchange, you get your timelimited monopoly.
STEVEN LIEBERMAN: Having represented pharmaceutical
companies for many years, as a practical matter, they try to file patent
applications as early in the drug development process as possible. Very often,
they don't know exactly what the drug is going to be. Once they figure it out,
sometimes it's too late to go back and it takes care of the problem. I don't think
– [crosstalk]
MARTIN ADELMAN: It's a generic invention in the first place. You
read this patent specification, and they knew they were close. They were trying
to modify a particular nucleoside and they wanted to find one that would work
and maybe having a methyl in the up position gave them some advantage, but
that's all they came up with. The thing that really worked, which they didn't
14

Session 2C

have, was to also have a fluorine in the down position, which was very difficult
to do, and they didn't do it. Why should they get anything for it?
STEVEN LIEBERMAN: Marty, I think you've got to look at it in the
context of both economics and the morality issues that Joshua was talking about
in the last panel.
MARTIN ADELMAN: Oh, no.
STEVEN LIEBERMAN: Let me just [unintelligible] for a second. Look,
I mostly represent generic companies, but I also represent brands from time to
time. They're spending hundreds of millions of dollars on research. Often, they
think they have something, but the process takes a year, two years, three years
– [crosstalk].
MARTIN ADELMAN: They generate hundreds of millions.
STEVEN LIEBERMAN: [unintelligible] going ahead turns out to be
toxic. By the time you realize what the real drug target is, it's too late. You try
to get protection early because, frankly, you don't have patent protection. There
were very few, and Nick, I think, will confirm this, there are very few companies
out there that will bring a drug to market if they don't have patent protection.
MARTIN ADELMAN: Gilead brought it to market, made $60 billion.
They had patent protection on what the invention really was.
STEVEN LIEBERMAN: I'm just trying to explain how this happens.
MARTIN ADELMAN: I know.
NICHOLAS GROOMBRIDGE: I think we could easily get drawn into
a discussion with Josh who isn't even here.
MARTIN ADELMAN: But he is in spirit. He is in spirit because every
time I think of his arguments, I oppose them.
NICHOLAS GROOMBRIDGE: Let me throw out a question. Is the
Supreme Court going to abolish assignor estoppel?
MARTIN ADELMAN: Who cares? This is the most ridiculous case that
they're taking. The guys don't have enough to do? I'm selling something, and
then they say it's a piece of shit, but everybody should have freedom, Lear v.
Adkins, to do this kind of stuff. I just can't believe they'd take a case like this.
DIMITRIOS DRIVAS: I think to your point, Nick, the fact that they
asked the Solicitor General to present oral argument and the position that the
US has taken, that the doctrine should be maintained, but its contours should be
defined, may be signaling where they might go.
MARTIN ADELMAN: That's what they're spending their time doing
when we have serious problems, like 101.
DIMITRIOS DRIVAS: I don't know if they could fix that one. Might be
too late for them.
MARTIN ADELMAN: Oh, I could fix it in a minute. Overturn Funk
Brothers. Overturn the idea that something that you discovered can be treated
as prior art. Funk Brothers is the first case that brought that up. It's Douglas,
he's always wrong. The Supreme Court just mindlessly follows it. That's what
they do. They make up something and they call it a discovery, or they give it a
name and they say, "You came up with it, but it's prior art."
DIMITRIOS DRIVAS: I agree. Marty. I don't think there should be any
judicial exception to patentability.
MARTIN ADELMAN: Clearly neither does Congress. They never
enacted one.
DIMITRIOS DRIVAS: Yes, but will they go there? I doubt it.
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MARTIN ADELMAN: I doubt it. They're too busy screwing the country
up to do that.
STEVEN LIEBERMAN: Please don't be so ambiguous. Tell us what
you really think about the Supreme Court.
MARTIN ADELMAN: All right, Nick, you're [unintelligible].
NICHOLAS GROOMBRIDGE: I don't think they will take a 101 case.
Even though the problem is of their creation.
MARTIN ADELMAN: I kind of agree with you, so we have to live with
it.
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